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ABSTRACT
We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent of
organizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regarding
resistance to union organizing. The central exogenous variable in the
analysis is the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available to be split
between unions and employers.
-
Wemeasure available quasi-rents per worker as the differenceper
worker between total industry revenues net of raw materialscosts and labor
costs evaluated at the opportunity cost of the workers.Using two-digit
industry level data for thirty-five U.S. industries for the period 1955
through 1986, we find that both organizing activity and employer resistance
to unionization are positively related to available quasi-rentsper worker.
However, there is- still a strong negative trend in union organizingactivity
and a strong positive trend in employer resistance aftercontrolling for
quasi-rents per worker. Thus, the explanation for the decline in union
organizing activity and the increase in employer resistance to unionization
since the mid l970's lies elsewhere.
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The dramatic reduction in union organization through representation
elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NIlE) has been a
major contributor to the sharp decline in the extent of unionization in the
United States since the mid-1970's (Dickens and Leonard, 1985). According to
information from the May Current Population Survey (CPS), the percentage of
private nonagricultural workers who were union members fell from 25.6% in
1973 to 14.1% in 1985. Over the same period, the percentage of nonunion
workers who were organized through NLRB representation elections fell from
approximately 0.55% in 1973 to approximately 0.13% in 1983.1 Employer
resistance to union organizing has increased dramatically over a longer
period with the number of unfair labor practice complaints filed by unions
against employers alleging illegal activity in the course of a union
organizing effort rising from 9 complaints per thousand workers eligible to
vote in NIlE representation elections in 1955 to 33 complaints per thousand
in 1973 to 87 complaints per thousand in in 1985.
We argue in this study that the decline in organization andthe
increase in employer resistance may result from increases in competitiveness
that reduce the quasi-rents available to be split between fins and workers.
We build a model of rent-maximizing union behavior with regard to the extent
of unionization in an industry where the employers optimally select a level
of resistance to union organization. Wethenlink the decline in union
organizingactivity to a decline in the optimal extent of unionization for a
rent-maximizing union. The model implies that (1) the optimal extent of
These figures overstate the level of effective new organization because
ofan increasingly common failure to negotiate a first contract following an
election victory. An AFL-CIO survey suggests that unions only are able to
negotiate first contracts in 63% of election victories (MacDonald, 1985).-2-
unionization and, hence) the quantity of organizing activity and (2) employer
resistance to unionization will bothbe relatedto the quantity of
quasi-rents available to be split between unions and employers.
We usedata aggregated to the two-digitindustry level for 35 U.s.
industriesfor the period 1955 through 1986 to investigate 1) the
relationship between the change in available quasi-rents per worker and union
organizingactivity in the form of NLRB representation election activity and
2) the relationship between the level of quasi-rents per worker and employer
resistance in the formofunfair-labor-practice charges filed with the NIlE.
For our purposes, quasi-rents per worker are defined as the differenceper
worker between total industryrevenues net of raw materials costs and labor
costs evaluated at the opportunity wage of the workers.We find that both
employerresistance and organizing activity are significantly positively
related to the change in available quasi-rents per worker. However,even
altercontrolling for changes in quasi-rents per worker, astrong negative
trendin union organizing activity remains.
II.Stylized IisxL shi Modus-ODerandi21 Anerican Labor Unions
In this section, we argue thatunions in the United States are
primarilyorganizations that extract quasi-rentsfrom employers in particular
industries. A reasonable objective for such a union is the maximization of
its share of the quasi-rents.2 The quasi-rents accruing toany particular
unionmember are simply the difference between theworker's union wage rate
2A variety of objective functions have been used in theanalysis of union
behavior. See, for example, Dunlop (1944), Farber (1978), Dertouzos and
Pencavel (1980), Carruth and Oswald (1983), Pencavel (l984a, 1984b), and
MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986). Farber (1986) presents a selective survey of
this literature.-3-
and the opportunity wage rate in the worker's next best employment
alternative. More specifically, assume that there are N union members and
that there are L workers employed at the union wage.3 the N-L union members
who are not employed at the union wage are employed at their opportunity
wage. Assuming that all union workers are identical and noting that union
members employed at their opportunity wage generate no quasi-rents, the total
quasi-rents(It) accruingto union members are
(11.1) S.L•IW
-W]
whereV is the union wage, U is the opportunity wage. If the union
maximizes this objective function, it will maximize the wealth available for
distribution to the individual union members (including those not employed at
the union wage).
We assume that quasi-rents are extracted from employers in a strongly
efficient fashion so that unions and employers are involved in bargaining
over the split of a pie of fixed size (a zero-sum game).4 In other words,
the quantity of quasi-rents available to be distributed between the union and
the employers is not affected by the actions of the union regarding either
its organizing decisions or its positions in bargaining. While strong
3Thedetermination of the relevant group of workers for a union to consider in
making itsdecisionsis a fundamental issue in the analysis of union
objectives which has not been seriously addressed in therecent literature.
SeeDunlop(1944) andFarber (1986). In the context of this study, a
sufficient condition for a unionto value the gains that accrue to potential
members is that the union be free to redistribute income within the union
subjectto the constraint that a workerwould leave union employment rather
thanbe made worse off than he would be in a nonunion job.
'Strong efficiency is defined by Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) as efficiency
in the sense that employment will be set at the level where the value of
marginal product of labor equals the opportunitywage of labor rather than
theactual union wage. While they present evidence from one industry that
labor contracts are not strongly efficient, Abowd (1989) presents evidence
from a national sample of contracts that cannot reject strong efficiency.-4-
efficiency is not strictly necessary to understand our approach to the
determination of union organizing activity, it greatly simplifies the
discussion and analysis because it implies that a measure of the total
quasi-rents available in an industry can serve as an exogenous measure of the
potential gain from unionization.
Quasi-rents in an industry may be derived from underlying imperfections
in the product market such as a natural monopoly or oligopoly, from
government regulation that erects an entry barrier, or from producer specific
capital that prevents potential competitors from duplicating existing firms.5
Quasi-rents also include the normal competitive return to the fixed assets in
an industry, tie abstract from the possibility that unions can organize
competitive industries and act as an upstream monopolist1 generating
quasi-rents from the product market. Fundamentally, the process of
organizing large numbers of competitive producers in order to create
quasi-rents is bound to provide less benefit per dollar expended than
organizing a small number of oligopolistic producers. Thus, unions are more
likely to form where there are "ready-made" quasi-rents from noncompetitive
industrialstructures or where the natureof the assets in the industry
limitsthe possibilities for employers to protect the normal return component
of the quasi-rents by transferring the assets to other industries.
III. flit Union Decision Process and OptimalLevel fUnionization
A major departure in this study from the earlier literature on the
determination of the union status of workers is that the union, rather than
the workers, is considered the central decision maker. Theorganizing costs
5Rose (1985) analyzes the the existenceand incidence of quasi-rents due to
government regulation of the trucking industry prior to 1978.-5.
for an existing union are smaller than the direct costs the workers face
because of economies of scale in conducting numerous campaigns and the
advantages of having a professional staff. In addition, the union will
perceive general benefits from organizing currently nonunion jobs in the form
of an improved bargaining position for the union because it has organized a
larger share of the industry's workforce. Consequently, the union's net
benefit from organization exceed the workers' private benefit and the union
is making the relevant decision about which jobs to organize.
Formally, the union in industry j is attempting to maximize the total
quasi-rents accruing to union labor in that industry net of the costs
of organizing the the chosen number of workers:
(111.1) —S. -
-
whereC represents the costs of organization.
The union appropriates quasi-rents through a quasi-rent extraction
function, which relates the quantity of quasi-rents received by union labor
to the quantity of quasi-rents available and the extent of unionization in
the industry:
(111.2) —Qh(U)
where Qrepresentsthe total quantity of quasi-rents in the industry, U
represents the proportion of workers in the industry who are unionized, and
h(.) is an increasing function with a nonpositive second derivative. If the
function h(U) —Uthen the union simply gets a share of the rents in the
industry equal.toits share of employment. In this case, the benefit of
increased organization to the union is precisely the benefit that the workers
generate themselves. The idea that the benefit of increased organization to
the union exceeds the benefit to the workers directly involved is formalized
by ôh(U)/OU >1.
The costs of organizing workers will vary with the amount of resistance-6-
by employers. In this context, the cost (C) of organizing L workers in
industry j can be expressed as:
(111.3) C —L-g(U,S)
where S is the amount of resistance to union organizing offered
by employers
in industry j. The function g is the average cost per worker of
organization, which is assumed to be positively related to the extent of
unionization and increasing in U so that ög/ÔU > 0. We alsoassume that
the marginal cost of organization is increasing so that 82g/8u2 > 0.This
assumption is motivated by the necessity of organizing workers who are less
favorably disposed toward unions and jobs that are less favorably situated
for unionization (e.g.. smaller establishments) as theexisting degree of
unionization increases. The average cost of organization ispositively
related to employer resistance so that 8g/3S > 0. The effectivenessof
employer resistance declines at the margin so that 82g/as2 < 0.




as the objective function for the union noting that L—N -U where N isthe iii i
level of total employment in industry j. The union'sdecision problem is to
determine the extent of industrial unionization that maximizesthis objective
function. Assuming that employer resistance isset exogenously, the first
order condition is:




where q is quasi-rents per worker(Q/N). The first term represents the
marginal benefit in increased quasi-rents per worker and the secondterm
represents the marginal cost of increased unionization. The sufficient
second order conditions for a maximum are that themarginal benefit of.7-
unionization be decreasing in U (82h/8U C 0) and the marginal cost of
unionization be increasing in U (ö2g/8U > 0).
Equation (111.5) implicitly determines the optimal extent of
unionization (U;) in industry j as:
(111.6) U; —
whereaif/aq. is positive. Thus, the optimal extent of unionization is
increasing in the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available in the
industry. Furthermore, aid/as C 0 as long as the marginal cost of
organization does not decrease with employer resistance.6
Suppose now that employer resistance is a (unspecified) function of
quasi-rents per worker. Equation (111.6) can be rewritten as
(111.7) U —f(q,S(q)),
so that the total derivative of the optimal extent of unionization with
respect to a change in quasi-rents per worker is
(111.8) du;,dq —8U/Oq+au/8S.dsdq.
The first term is positive (the optimal extent of unionization increases with
quasi-rents holding resistance fixed). The first part of the second term is
negative (the optimal extent of unionization decreases with employer
resistance holding quasi-rents fixed) under fairly general conditions. The
last term is crucial. Clearly, a sufficient condition for the optimal extent
of unionization to increase with quasi-rents (d!f/dq 0) is that employer
resistance not increase with quasi-rents (dS/dq s 0). The optimal extent
6This is a sufficient condition. The necessary and sufficient condition for
au/as < 0 is that (Bg/8S3 + U'8g2(U.S)/OUOSJ > 0. The first ten is
positive by assumption. The cross-partial derivative in the second term is
the change in the marginal cost of organization with employer resistance. It
is reasonable that this is positive.-8-
ofunionization will increase with quasi-rentseven when employer resistance
increases with quasi-rents so long as employer resistancedoes not increase
toosharply (dS/dq < -8U;,8/ÔU/8S).
IV. &wloverDecision Process 4QDtimplEmployer Resistance
Consider a simple model of employer behavior wherethe firmgetsthe
residual of the quasi-rents after the union hasextracted labor's share net
of the costs of resisting unionization. Thisis
(IV.l) V —Q•flh(U)J-S
normalizingthe price of a unitofresistance to unionization to one. The
firm will choose the optimal resistancelevel so as to maximize V subject
to the constraint that the union will choosethe extent of unionization
optimally conditionsi on the resistance offered
by the employer (equation
111.6). The relevant constrained maximizationis:
(IV.2) L —waxQ[l-h(U)J
-S+A[U - f(4S)]






The first condition defines Aas the shadow price to the firm of an increase
in unionization The secondcondition determines the optimalquantity of
employer resistance asanequality between the marginal cost of resistance
(normalized to one) andthemarginal effect of resistance on the extent of
unionization times the shadow price ofunionization. The third condition is
the constraint that the unionchooses the extent of unionizationoptimally.
Since the optimal extent ofunionization as chosen by the union (the f
function) depends on first derivativesof the rent extraction function and
the cost of organization
function1 the firm's optimal choice of resistance-9-
depends on second derivatives of these functions (see the second of equations
IV.3). Thus, any àomparative statics regarding the firms decision (most
centrally, öS/8q4) will depend on third derivatives of the rent extraction
and cost of organization functions. While me may know a bit about first
derivatives and are willing to make assumptions about some second
derivatives, it is unrealistic to pretend knowledge of third derivatives.
Thus, we cannot make any predictions based on this model about how employer
resistance will respond to a change in quasi-rents.
On the one hand, it may be the case that because an increase in
quasi-rents makes unionization more costly (more dollars are lost at any
level of U), employers will fight unionization harder. On the other hand,
it may be that an increase in quasi-rents reduces the effectiveness of
fighting unions because of the shape of the organization cost function so
that employers will resist unionization less.
The conventional wisdom (e.g., Freeman 1985) seems to be that
employers, in the face of economic threats and increased competition, resist
unionization more strongly. While this outcome is consistent with the simple
model laid out here, the general argument in support of the view that
employer resistance increases with a decline in quasi-rents runs along
different lines than our model. Essentially, it is argued that in a
competitive environment firms cannot afford to live with unioni. If a firm
becomes unionized, it may not be able to continue operating. Thus, the
management resists unions more strongly. Implicit in this argument is one or
both of two possibilities. First, firms may share rents with unions
more-or-less voluntarily when times are good (Akerlof, 1982). Second,
managers of firms threatened with unionization in a time of increased
competition may spend more resources fighting unions than is optimal from the
shareholders' perspective in order to continue the firm in operation and/or- 10-
maintain their positions as managers.
The conclusion is that it is an empiricalmatter as to whether employer
resistance increases or decreases with quasi-rents. Thisalso makes it
difficult to make an unambiguous prediction
regarding how the optimal extent
of unionization is related to quasi-rents. Whatwe can say is that the
optimal extent of unionization is positively related toquasi-rents unless
employer resistance increases too rapidly. Oneunambiguousprediction is
that if we find that employers resist unionization
more strongly as
quasi-rents decline (OS/Oq <0)then it is the case that the optimalextent
of unionization is positively related toquasi-rents. At least one of the
optimal responses to an increase in q mustbepositive.
V. EmDirical SDecificatimj Union OrzanizinActivity 4EmoloverUnfair
Labor Practices
Thesystem of equations in IV.3 determines a Nash equilibriujibetween
the union and the employer that determincesthe extent of unionization and
quantity of employer resistance. The quantity oforganizing activityis used
tomove the actual extent of unionization toward theoptimal extent of
unionization. In a simple adjustzAent modelthequantity of organizing
activityin period t is a function of thechange in the optimal extent of
unionization between period t-l andperiod t. More formally, let
(V.1) A —A(U -if it it it—I.
where A represents the
quantity of organizing activity in industry j and
year t. The function A(•) is an increasing function ofthe change in the
optimal extent of unionization This doesnot imply that there will be no
organizing activity if the optimal extent of unionizationis unchanged.
There is likely to be ageneral "depreciation" of the stock of union jobsas
nonunion fins enteran industryand older union firms shrink. Thus, we-11-
expectthat A(O) > 0.
A first order approximation to the change in the optimal extent of
unionization based on equation (111.6) is
(V.2)
- — fl +flaq
where6q is the change in total quasi-rents per worker in industryj
betweenperiod t-l and period t and ft0 and fl are parameters. Assuming a
linear form for the function A() and an additive error yields
(V.3) A —a+ft + a (ft Aq]+ c
it 0 0 1 1 it it
where a and a are positive parameters and is the random component.
Given a measure of organizing activity and data on changes in total rents per
worker, the parameters of this model can be estimated with standard linear
techniques. Note that it is not possible to identify both the a's and the
fl's. A normalized version of (IV.3) is
(V.4) A —y+8q +c it 0 1 Jt it
where the "s are the parameters to be estimated.
The central measure of organization activity used in our analysis is
the fraction of the currently unorganized workforce that are involved in
representationelections- -E/M,where E represents the number of workers
inpotential bargaining units where elections were held in industry j in year
t and H is the quantity of nonunion employment in industry jandyear t.
We call our measure the organization effort rate (OER) because it is the
relative quantity of election activity undertaken. Oneproblemwith our
measurethat we cannot address is that it misses organization activity that
does not progress to the point of an election.
'Dickens and Leonard (1985) consider this measure in their analysis of the
decline of unionization. Voos (1983) uses data on direct union expenditures
on organization to analyze union organizing activity.-12-
Inour empirical analysis we use the logit transformation of the
organization effort rate as the key dependent variable. The resulting
regression is
(V.5) logit(E/M) —X.y+aq+
where is a vector of variables affecting the organization effort rate and
is a vector of related coefficients. The vector X includes such
variables as a time trend, the rate of change of real CNP, and industry
effects. The key parameter of interest in the model isy•
Wecannot make an unambiguous prediction for the sign ofunless
quasi-rentsand employer resistance to unionization negatively related. In
this case y would be positive. However, if quasi-rents andemployer
resistance to unionization are positively related, then could be positive
or negative according to our theoretical model.
Employer resistance to unionization takes many forms that arevery
difficult to measure. Some examples are (1) higherwages, (2) creation of
union-like grievance, job posting, and promotion mechanisms, (3)legal
discouragement of worker interest in unions, and (4) illegal discouragement
of worker interest in unions. We focus on the last of thesetechniques as
measured by thenumberof unfair labor practice claims filed by unions
allegingillegal activities by employers in the course of organization
campaigns.The particular measure we useis the number of claimsfiled (F)
pereligible voter (E). This ratio(F/E). while it measuresonly a
part of employer resistance, captures the intensityof overt employer
resistance of a certain type and at a certainstage of the organization
process.We call our employer resistance measure the unfair laborpractice
rate (UFLPR).
Inthe empirical analysis we use the logarithm of the number of
unfairlabor practices per eligible worker. The resultingregression is-13-
(V.6) log(F/E) —X60+ 61r+
where X is a vector of variables affecting the resistance level and
it
-
6is a vector of related coefficients. The vector X includes such
0 it
variables as a time trend, the rate of change of real CNP, and industry
effects. The key parameter of interest in this regression is 6. Note that
this specification uses the level of quasi-rents per worker rather than the
change.This is because the theory in section IVsuggests that employer
resistanceto unionization is a function of the level of quasi-rents because
the loss to the employer from unionization is related to the level of
quasi-rents. In contrast, organization activity is a measure of the change
in the optimal extent of unionization, so it is a function of the change in
quasi -rents.
Once again, we cannot make an unambiguous theoretical prediction
regarding the sign of £.However,determining its sign empirically is
central to understanding how union organizing and the optimal extent of
unionization are related to quasi-rents.
VI. flfl g4 Measurement Jy Variables
Themodel is implemented using data from1955 through 1986 for
thirty-fiveindustries atapproximately the two-digit (SIC) industry group
level of aggregation. The industry groups are listed in Table L They
include all of the manufacturing sector, wholesale and retail trade, selected
transportation industries, communication, utilities, mining, and selected
service industries. Parts of the transportation sector (air and rail) were
not included because they are not covered by the National Labor Relations
Act. Parts of the service sector were not included because there was
insufficient information to compute organizing effort, unfair labor practice
rates, or quasi-rents per worker. -Table 1:
Industries Included in Analysts and OpportunityWage Index
Name SIC Industries Wage Index
Food and Tobacco 20, 21 1.044
Textile Kills 22 0.880
Apparel 23 0.791
Lumber and Wood Products 24 1.032
Furniture 25 0.961
Paper 26 1.126
Printing and Publishing 27 0.996
Chemicals 28 1.164
Petroleum Products 29 1.296
Rubber andPlastic 30 1.026
Leather 31 0.833
Stone, Clay, and Glass 32 1.105
PrimaryMetals 33 1.194
Ferrous Metals 34 1.136
Machinery, exc. Electrical 35 1.176
Electrical Equipment 36 1.088
Aircraft 372 1.214
Transport. Equip. (cxc. air) 37 (except 372) 1.214
Instruments 38 1.137
Misc. Manufacturing 39 0.965
Mining, exc. Fuels 10, 14 1.121
CoalMining 12 1.154
Wholesale Trade 50 1.104
Retail Trade 52-59 0.829
Finance, Insurance, andRealEstate 60-65 0.994
HighwayFreightandWarehousing 42 1. 146
Other Transport. (cxc. rail, auto, air)41, 44, 46, 47 1.086
Communications 48 1.061
Utilities 49 1.209
Oil, and Gas Extraction 13 1.174
Hotel Services 70 0.744
Amusement Services 79 0.784
Health Services 80 0.825
Zusiness Services 73 0.968
Motion Pictures 78 1.001-14-
A. Organization Effort Rate
The numerator of the organization effort rate, the number of workers
eligible to vote in representation elections by industry and year, is
available for cases closed by the NLRR in each industry in each year from the
annual reports of the NIlE. The denominator of the organization effort rate,
nonunion employment by industry and year. is more difficult to measure.
Average annual employment by industry was extracted from the National Income
and Product Accounts tables for two-digit industry. To overcome the absence
of published data on union coverage by industry prior to 1973 we developed
the imputation procedure described below.
Data on the union status of workers by industry are available from the
May Current Population Surveys from 1973 through 1985 (with the exception of
1982). Prior to 1973 there is no industry breakdown of union status. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980) published an annual time series on union
membership for the private nonagricultural labor force for the period from
1955 through 1978. An industry-level times series on unionization was
computed for the 1955 through 1978 period by a two step procedure: 1) We
assumed that the inter-industry mix of unionization was unchanged over this
period and had the values computed from the May 1973-75 CPS's and 2) We
adjusted the extent of unionization in each industry every year so that the
employment weighted average extent of unionization across industries matched
the total reported by the ELS for that year.' After 1978 we used fractions
'The assumption of unchanging mix of unionization across industries is
troublesome for a study that is focused on industry level explanations for
the decline in unionization. However, we are using our constructed series
only to normalize the level of organizing activity and not as a central
variable to be explained. Our series is not adequate to serve as the key
dependent variable, but it is adequate to scale the level of organizing
activity.-15-
unionized computed as three year averages from the May CPS's.9 Specifically,
we used the average of the current year and the first two lags of the
fraction unionized by industry in order to reduce measurement error causedby
relatively small sample sizes in some industry cells.
Figure 1 contains a graph for each industry of the organization effort
rate by year. These graphs illustrate (1) the dramatic decline in
organization activity since the mid-1970's and (2) that this decline seems to
be present in almost all industries. One word of caution ininterpreting
these graphs (and the graphs in the figures that follow) is that they-axes
all have different scales so that comparisons of magnitudes across industries
are not meaningful. As a benchmark, we ran a simple regression weighted by
nonunionemployment of the logit transformation of the organization effort
rate on a time trend(T),(RT) an additional (splined) trend after 1973 (RT),




where the numbers in parentheses are standarderrors and the R1fromthe
regression was .812. What we find is a positive trend through 1973 and a
sharp decline after 1973. One important test of the role of product market
competition is the extent to which controlling for changes in quasi-rentscan
account for the post-1973 decline in the organization effort rate.
2We obtained 1982 values forunionization by industry as a straight average
of the 1981 and 1983 values. Recall that the CPS didnot contain any
information on union status in 1982.
10The time trend equalszero in 1954, one in 1955, etc. The additional time
trend equals zero before 1974, one in 1974, two in 1975,etc.-16-
B. UnfairLabor Practice Rate
The unfair labor practice rate is defined as the number of unfair labor
practice charges per worker eligible to vote in NIRB supervised
representation elections. The number of unfair labor practice charges is
available for cases received by the N1.RB in each industry in each year from
the annual reports of the NIlE. The number of workers eligible to vote in
representation elections is the same number used in the numerator of the
organization effort rate."
Figure 2 contains a graph for each industry of the unfair labor
practice rate by year. These graphs illustrate the general increase (at an
increasing rate) in the rate of unfair labor practices. There seems to be an
unusual, spike in unfair labor practice charges evident in a number of
industries in 1983 and/or 1984.12 As a benchmark we ran a simpleregression
weighted by the number of eligible voters of the log of the unfair labor
practice rate on a time trend (T). an additional (splirted) trend after 1973
(RT), and complete set of industry effects:'3
log(U}tPR) —X4+.0636T+.03l8RT
(.0025) (.0060)
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors and the P.2 from the
regression was .815. We find a strong positive trend through 1973 that
'1The unfair labor practice chargesare not perfectly temporally linked to the
elections with which they are associated. There can be substantial lags
between when election cases are closed and when the associated unfair labor
practice charges are resolved. Given limitations in the way the data are
reported, our most sensible option in computing the ratio is to use the
number of unfair labor practice charges received for the numerator and the
number of workers eligible to vote in elections in cases closed for the
denominator.
rechecked the data and could find no problems.
'3Thesetrends are defined in the previous note.- -17-
increases by about fifty percent after 1973. Rerunning this regression
omitting years after 1982 (and the unusual spikes) actually results in a




where the R2 was .804. Thus, the increase in the trend after 1973 is not due
to the spikes in the unfair labor practice rate after 1982. Another
important test of the role of product market competition is the extent to
which controlling for quasi-rents can account for the increase over time in
the unfair labor practice rate.
C. Quasi-Rents per Worker
Thedefinition of total quasi-rents (Q)inindustry j and year t is
revenues (REV )lessraw materials costs MAT less labor costs evaluated at it it
the opportunity wage of the workers (tf):
(VI.l) Q—REV-MAT -WN it it itit ,jt
whereN is total employment."The measure was developed at the firm level
andaggregated to the industry level using a procedure described below.
The firm level dataonrevenues (from 1955 to 1986) were computed from
the universe of 6,300 finns contained in the Standard and Poor'sCOMPUSTAT
AnnualIndustrialFile, AnnualResearchFile, and the supplemental historical
data files available from Standard and Poor's that containinformation for
fiscal years prior to 1967. The firms wereassigned to two-digit SIC
industries by Standard and Poor's on the basis ofproduct line information
from the 10K reports. Revenues were definedas net sales--the amountof
actualbillingsto customers for regularsales completed during the period
14Note that thismeasure of quasi-rents does notsubtract out the opportunity
costof capital. Thus, we are implicitlyassumingthat all existing capital isfixed and that its return ispotentially appropriable by the union.-18-
reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales, and allowances
for which credit is given to customers.
Since the firms in the COMPUSTAT universe are only a subset of the
fins in the industry, a measure of total quasi-rents in the industry cannot
be derived directly from these data. However, we are interested in
quasi-rents per worker so that the quasi-rents per worker in each firm i in
industry j in year t canbe measured as
(VI.2) Q1jt/N1jt — - MAT- WN
where variables subscripted ijt are the firm level analogs of the industry
level data. The industry average quasi-rents per worker were computed as the
employment weighted average of the fin level quasi-rents per worker. More
formally, this is
(VI.3) Q/N —w.IJt±tJ
where is the employment weight computed as
(VI.4) 0ijt —N1/) N1j
wherethe summation is over the i firmsinindustry j in year t that are
contained in the COMPUSTAT sample.
Since our analysis is conducted at the industry level, some alternative
measuresof quasi-rents per worker were available from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPAs). We developed our measures from COMPUSTAT firm
leveldata because Standard andPoor's sampling frame is more appropriate for
ourmodel than the NIPA sampling frame. COMFUSTAT includes current and
historical information on successful firms. By combining the current,
research and historical data files, we constructed samples of successful
firms in operation during the years 1955 to 1986. The NIPA's include
information from all establishments that operated during the year in the
particular industry. Establishments are sampled at different rates but the-19-
NIPA totals are designed to be representative of the industry and not just
the successful firms in the industry. Clearly, only ongoing (i.e.
successful) businesses can be organized. It is important from out
perspective to use quasi-rent measures based upon firms at risk to face
representation elections, and COMPUSTAT firms meet this criterion.
Because of U.S. accounting conventions, only data on revenues are
available consistently at the firm level. We assume that raw materials
costs and opportunity wages show only industry and time variation. Thus, we





Raw materials costs were computed using the direct requirements per
dollar of gross output tables by industry from the Input-Output Tables of the
United States for 1958, 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, and l982.' These tables
provide information on the fraction of gross output in each industry that
comes from other industries. Let v represent the fraction of gross output
in industry j that comes from other industries. The total raw materials
costs in industry j were then computed as
(VI.6) MAX —v REV
ititit
whichis the share of net revenues that flow to other industries as purchases
ofintermediate goods.
Note that1-v is the fraction of gross output in industry j that is
value added.The definition of quasi-rents per worker can be rewritten as
(vI.7) —(1.v).(E J
-
'5Thedata for years 1955 to 1957 were taken from the 1958 Input-Output
tables.Thedata for1983 to 1986 were taken from the 1982 Input-Output
tables.The data forother yearsfor which no table is available were based
onlinearlyinterpolated values between the twoclosest tables.-20-
which is value added per worker less the opportunity wage of the workers.
The weights (w),revenues(REV), and employment (N) are derived from
the COMPUSTAT data. The value added share (l-v) is derived from the
input-output tables. All that remains is computation of the opportunity
wage.
The industry opportunity wage is the average wage that workers in the
industry could earn in their best alternative jobs. As such, it has two key
sources of variation. First, there is inter-industry variation in the skill
levels and demographic characteristics of workers that are related towages.
Second, there is time series variation in the level of wages. It is not
possible to get detailed data on earnings by worker characteristics for the
entire time period needed, so a two step procedure was used to compute the
opportunity wage.
In the first stage, an industry wage index was computed for the
1973-1975 period. Data on earnings and other characteristics of
private-sector workers from the May 1973, May 1974, and May 1975 Current
Population Surveys was pooled. An earnings function of the standard form,
(VI.8) lnW —X$+ c UU ii
for workers i in industry j was estimated using this sample. The X vector
contains measures of sex, race, marital status, the interaction of sex and
marital status, education, potential experience, the interaction of sex and
potential experience, nine-category region, and one-digit occupation. No
measures of union status or industry were included in this regression so that
the predicted wages derived using this sample would be representative of what
a worker with &givenset of observable characteristics could earn elsewhere
in the economy! For the same reason, the CPS sample includes workers in all
16lmplicit in this treatment is the assumption that union and inter-industry-21-
industries and not simply those in the thirty-five industries used directly
in the analysis.
The estimated coefficients of this regression were then used to compute
an average opportunity wage for workers in each industry as
(VI.9) £OJ) —exp(XB+ 5;2)
where X is the average value of the X in industry j andis the
estimated residual variance from the regression. This is converted to an
index value for each industry (I) by dividing E(W) by the employment
weighted average of the predicted wage across all industries. The last
column of Table 1 contains values of this index for the thirty-five
industries used in our analysis.
In the second stage of the procedure our measure of the industry annual
opportunity wage for industry j in year t is computed as the product of our
wage index, average hourly earnings for private non-agricultural workers
(ARE), and average annual hours measured as average weekly hours for private
nonagricultural workers (AWH) times 52. This is
(VI.lO) —52(1•ARE•AWH ). it. i t t
Thus,our measure of the opportunity wage has cr?ss-section variation based
only on 1973-1975 differences in worker characteristics, and there is no
industry-specific time series variation. However, as long as the industry
skill mix and the returns to skill are not changingvery rapidly, our measure
will capture important inter-industry and time-series variation in the
opportunity wage of workers.
wage differentials do not reflect unmeasured individual skills. To the
extent that they do reflect unmeasured individual skills, the correct
procedure would be to include them in the regressions and in the predictions.
See Murphy and Topel (1987), Dickens and Katz (1987), and Cibbons and Katz
(1989).-22-
It is useful to examine the time series by industry ofreal quasi-rents
per worker and its components. Recall from equation VI.7 that quasi-rents
per worker was computed as the difference between value added per workerand
the opportunity wage. Figures 3 and 4 contain graphs byyear for each
industry of the sumofthe first three lags of real value addedper worker
andthesum of the first three lags of the real opportunity wage. Thesumof
three lags is used here and in all computations regardingquasi-rents and its
components in order to smooth the data intertemporally. Figure 3 shows that
there is quite a bit of variation in the time patterns of realvalue added
per worker across industries though many industries show a period of increase
through the l970's. Figure 4 makes clear the fact that there isonly
aggregate time series variation in the real opportunity wage. Every
industry
shows the same time series pattern which reflectsmovements in average hourly
earnings in private nonagricultural employment. Essentially,aggregate real
wages were rising until the mid-l970's and falling thereafter. The levels
vary due to differences in skill across industries.
Figure 5 presents a graph for each industry of the sum of the first
three lags of real quasi-rents per worker byyear. Similarly, figure 6
presents a graph for each industry of the sumofthe first three lags of the
change in real quasi-rents per worker by year. While both figures show a
large amountofvariation in the time patterns across industries, itisnot
clearhow these relate to the organization effort rates in figure 1 or to the
unfair labor practice rates in figure 2. This is a focus of the econometric
analysisin the next section.
D.Other Measures
Asidefrom the splined time trend variables and a set of industry dummy
variables, only one other variable is used in the analysis. This is the rate
ofchange of real GtIP computed as the first difference of log CNP in 1982-23-
dollars, and it is included in the econometric analysis in the next section
to capture aggregate cyclical time series factors.
VII. Estimation the Orvanization Effort Model
Table 2 contains an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of the
organization effort rate. The analysis uses 911 observations on industry-
years with complete data on the variables needed for the analysis. This
covers some or all of the years 1959-1986 for the thirty-five industries
listed in table jh7 The first column of the table contains means and
standard deviations of the variables. The dependent variable is the logit
transformation of the organization effort rate. All models include industry
fixed effects, and all estimations are weighted by non-union employment.
The second and third columns of the table contain benchmark estimates
of the model. The model in column 2 includes the rate of change in real GNP
plus a splined (at 1973) time trend. This model illustrates the average
modest rate of growth of organization effort through the early 1970's and the
sharp decline thereafter. The model in column 3 includes a complete set of
year fixed effects in place of the three time-series variables (the splined
trend and the CNP variable). This model fits the data somewhat better than
the more parsimonious specification in column 2 (p-value <.0001).
The model in column four introduces the change in real quasi-rentsper
worker. The change in real quasi-rents and the organization effort rateare
17The year 1959 is the firstyear for which three lags on the change in real
quasi-rents are available given that quasi-rent data are not available prior
to 1955. There were complete data froit 1959 through 1986 forthirty of the
thirty-five industries. Data were not available to compute the organization
effort rate in some early years for the other five industries. Themissing
observations are: 1) hotel services, 1959-1971; 2) amusement services,
1959-1975; 3) health services, 1959-1963; 4) business services, 1959-1971; 5)
motion pictures1 1959-1974.TABLE 2
Models of the Effect of the Change in IndustryQuasi-rents
per Worker on the Organization Effort Rate
(35 Industries from 1959 to 1986)
Dependent Variable
logit(Eligible to Vote in Election per Nonunion Worker)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Mean Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Independent Var (St.Dev.) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Change in real, quasi .3462 .0433 .0409
rents/worker, $000, (2.448) (4.97) (4.62) sum of 1st 3 lags
Change in real value .3458 .0432
adder/worker, $000. (2.475) (4.97) sum of 1st 3 lags
Change in real opp. -.000469 -.150
wage, $000. (.2578) (1.56) sunof1st 3 lags
Trend .0222 .0235 .0218
(1954 —0) (3.68) (3.95) (3.54)
Recent Trend -.116 -.116 -.116
(1974—1) (11.6) (11.7) (11.8)
(—0 before 1973)
Change in log 0.030 -1.89 -1.499 -1.35
real GNP (0.024) (2.22) (1.78) (1.58)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls No Yes No Yes No
Root Mif .586 .562 .578 .555 .578
R-squared .805 .826 .810 .830 .811
Residual Deg. Freedom 873 849 872 848 871
Notes
a. All, means1 standard deviations, and estimates are derived weighted by
nonunion employment. All regressions include a constant.
b. Mean of dependent variable weighted by nonunion employment —-5.17
(standard deviation 1.30).
c. The overall sample size is 911 industry-years.-24-
significantly positively related. The estimates suggest that a one thousand
dollar increase in the change in quasi-rents per worker implies a 4.3 percent
increase in the odds that a nonunion worker will be involved in an election.
Because the weighted average organization effort rate in the sample is so low
(.0119), the estimates also imply that a one thousand dollar increase in the
change in quasi-rents per worker is related to a 4.3 percent increase (from
1.19 percent to 1.24 percent) in the probability that a nonunion worker will
be involved in an election.
Despite the statistical significance of the change in quasi-rents in
explaining the organization effort rate, results clearly show that
the decline in the organization effort rate since the early 1970's cannot be
explained by changes in quasi-rents. The estimates in column four show as
large a negative trend after 1973 as the estimates that do not include the
measure of change in quasi-rents.
The estimates in columns five and six investigate how robust the
finding of a significant positive relationship between the organization
effort rate and the change in quasi-rents is to variations in specification.
The specification in column five usesyear fixed effects in place of the
three aggregate time series variables. While the more parsimonious modelin
column 4 can be rejected (p-value <.0001), the estimate of the coefficientof
changes in real quasi-rents in virtually unchanged and is stillsignificantly
greater thanzero.
The specification is column six breaks the change inquasi-rents into
its twomajorcomponents and allows each to have its owncoefficient.The
estimates are consistent with the model in that thechange in real
• value-added per worker has a significant positive coefficient while the
change in the real opportunity wage has a (marginally) significantnegative
ffect of somewhat greater magnitude. Thehypothesis that the change in-25-
quasi-rents is the appropriate variable cannot be rejected at conventional
levels (p-value—.266).
VIII. Estimation jUnfairLabor Practice gg Model
Table 3, which has the same structure as table 2, contains anordinary
least squares (OLS) analysis of the unfair labor practice rate. Theanalysis
uses 966 observations on industry-years with complete data on the variables
needed for the analysis. This covers some or all of theyears 1958-1986 for
the thirty-five industries listed in table L1' The first column of the table
contains means and standard deviations of the variables. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the unfair labor practice rate. All
models include industry fixed effects, and all estimates are weighted by the
number of eligible voters.
The second and third columns of the table contain benchmark estimates
of the model. The model in column 2 includes the rate of change in real GNP
plus a splined (at 1973) time trend. This model illustrates the steady rate
of growth of the unfair labor practice rate through the early 1970's and the
sharp increase since that period. The model in column 3 includes a complete
set of year fixed effects in place of the three time-series variables. This
model fits the data somewhat better than the more parsimonious specification
in column 2 (p-value <.0001).
The model in column four introduces the level of real quasi-rents per
1The year 1958 is the firstyear for which three lags on real quasi-rents are
available given that quasi-rent data are not available prior to 1955. There
were complete data from 1959 through 1986 for thirty of the thirty-five
industries. Data were not available to compute the unfair labor practice rate
in some early years for the other five industries. The missing observations
are: 1) hotel services, 1958-1963; 2) amusement services, 1958-1963; 3)
health services, 1958-1963; 4) business services, 1958-1971; 5) motion
pictures, 1958-1974.TABLE 3
Models of the Effect of the Change in Industry Quasi-rents
per Worker on the Unfair Labor Practice Rate
(35 Industries from 1959 to 1986)
Dependent Variable














per worker, $000, (18.890)
sum of 1st 3 lags
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(5.56) (5.22)
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per worker, $000, (19.060)

































Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls No Yes No Yes No
Root MSE .371 .355 .365 .350 .364
R-squared .808 .830 .815 .835 .816
Residual Deg. Freedom 928 903 927 902 926
Notes
a. All means, standard deviations, and estimates are derived weighted by
the number of eligible voters. All regressions includea constant.-
b. Mean of dependent variable weightedby the number of eligible voters —
-3.78(standard deviation 0.831).
c. The overall sample size is 966 industry-years.-26-
worker. There is a significant positive relation between real quasi-rents
and employer resistance as measured by the unfair labor practice rate. The
estimates suggest that a one thousand dollar increase in real quasi-rents per
worker implies a 1.27 percent increase in the number of unfair labor
practices per eligible voter. At the mean of the sample (3.3 unfair labor
practice charges per 100 eligible voters), a one thousand dollar increase in
quasi-rents per worker implies approximately an additional one unfair labor
practice per 1000 eligible voters.
Once again, despite the statistical significance of quasi-rents in
explaining the unfair labor practice rate, the results clearly show that
neither the steady increase in the unfair labor practice rate throughout the
sample nor the sharp increase since the early 1970's can be explained by
quasi-rents. The estimates in column four show as large a positive trend
both before and after 1973 as the estimates that do not include the measure
quasi-rents.
The estimates in columns five and six investigate how robust the
finding of a significant positive relation between the unfair labor practice
rate and real quasi-rents is to variations in specification. The
specification in column five uses year fixed effects in place of the three
aggregate time series variables. While the more parsimonious model in column
4 can be rejected (p-value <.0001), the estimate of the coefficient of
changes in real quasi-rents falls only slightly and is still significantly
greater than zero.
The specification is column six breaks the change in quasi-rents into
its twomajorcomponents and allows each to have its owncoefficient.The
estimatesare consistent with the model in that the real value-added per
worker has a significant positive coefficient and the real opportunity wage
hasa significantly negative effect. The hypothesis that real quasi-rents is-27-
the appropriate variable can be rejected at conventional levels
(p-value—.025). This is due to the finding that the negative coefficient of
the real opportunity wage is significantly larger than the positive
coefficient of real value-added per worker. The point estimates suggest (1)
that a one thousand increase in real value-added per worker implies a 1.3
percent increase in unfair labor practices per eligible voter while (2) the
same one thousand dollar increase in the real (annual) opportunity wage
implies an approximately 13 percent decrease in unfair labor practices per
eligible voter.
One interpretation of our finding is that quasi-rents matter in the
determination of employer resistance, but there is a negative relationship
between the opportunity wage of the workers and employer resistance even
after accounting for quasi-rents. This suggests that employers resist
unionization by low skilled workers more than unionization by high skilled
workers. This may be because resistance is more effective among low skilled
workers or unionization is more costly (in terms of the rents extracted)
among low skilled workers.
IX. Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented here is consistent with the view that changes in
the total quasi-rents per worker in an industry play an important role in
unions' decisions regarding organizing activity. When quasi-rentsper worker
increase, unions want to increase the extent of unionization, and the result
is more organizing activity.
We also find a significant positive relationship between the level of
quasi-rents per worker and employer resistance in the form of unfair labor
practices. The theory we developed was ambiguous on this point, and the
finding of a positive relationship also makes the theory ambiguous with-28-
regard to how union organizing activity is related to quasi-rents.
Nonetheless, as an empirical matter, we find positive relationships between
quasi-rents and both union organizing activity and employer resistance.
Although the results are in accord with our model- -quasi-rents are an
important determinant of union organizing activity and employer
resistance- -the results are also disappointing because changes in the
quasi-rents available to split between workers and firms do not seem to
account for more than a small part of (I) the decline of union organizing
activity since the mid 1970's or (2) the dramatic increase in employer
resistance to unionization since the mid-1970's. A completeunderstanding of
the decline of unionization in the United States lies elsewhere.-29-
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